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Abstract
The commission split between real estate agents and their affiliated firms represents an
important incentive mechanism. A study of 1,477 agents indicates that total commission
revenue generated during the year affects the subsequent commission rate more than
volume of residential sales or transactions. Profit sharing and independent franchise firms
offer higher ending commission splits while larger firms offer lower commission splits.
The ending commission split for commission agents compared to agents on a 100% payout
contract, however, is not influenced as much by profit sharing, firm characteristics, and
the economic environment. . . ., >=
The real estate brokerage industry has received considerable criticism for not acting in
the interests of their clients and more generally, in the public interest. The potential
sources of this problem can be categorized into three areas: (1) state legislation with
regard to the real estate agency relationship; (2) the presence of fixed commission rates
in Multiple Listing Service (MLS) transactions; and (3) split commission arrangements
between agents and their affiliated firms. Miceli, Pancak, and Sirmans (2000) suggest that
problems with state legislation make buyers underrepresented, sellers unintentionally
liable for actions of unknown subagents, and dual agency status often imposed after the
fact.̂  The second problem has been extensively examined in studies such as Yinger
(1981), Crockett (1982), and Miceli (1992); most of this research indicates that fixed
commission rates appear to be above an equilibrium rate.^ The third problem represents
a potential conflict of the principal/agent relationship. The agent/firm split affects the
willingness of the agent to expend effort in listing and selling processes and perhaps the
quality of the agent's work. Agents who do not receive an adequate split relative to their
employing firm will certainly be less productive.'
Several empirical studies have investigated the factors that determine whether an agent
decides to work on a split commission or 100% payout contract. Zumpano, Johnson, and
Anderson (2009) and Chinloy and Winkler (2010, 2011) have identified determinants of
choosing between these contracts. The broader question of relating an agent's split
commission or 100% payoiit provision in one period to the next, however, has not been
investigated in any detail. This research study investigates this question, controlling for
agent and firm characteristics and market influences. The findings partially explain the
basis for agent reward and success and the importance of factors that firms must consider
for retaining and rewarding the most successful agents.
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Literature Review
The underpinnings of split commission contracts versus 100% contracts are based upon
the agency theory in economics and finance literature. Alchian and Demsetz (1972)
describe a similar relationship of shirking and monitoring in the context of team
production. Unlike Coase (1937), Alchian and Demsetz consider team production,
organization, monitoring, and shirking problems as fimdamental to their explanation of
the firm. Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe the problem of shirking by employees of
a firm, as well as the mechanisms to monitor and control shirking, which often result in
higher costs to the firm. Aligning the interests of agents as managers and shareholders as
principals through effective incentives and contracting can reduce shirking.
The concepts of principal-agent relationships have been examined in the real estate
literature for more than 30 years. Yinger (1981) develops a search model to explain the
market for broker services, the role of the MLS, and broker commission rates. A primary
conclusion is that the brokerage industry is not efficient, and that fixed commission rates
contribute to this problem. Wu and Colwell (1986) and Zorn and Larsen (1986) suggest,
however, that a commission rate contract partially overcomes the problem of not being
able to monitor an agent's activities. Miceli (1989) argues that a limited duration contract
can overcome moral hazard from the seller's perspective. Waller, Brastow, and Johnson
(2010) expand on Miceli's length of contract study, and find that a longer listing contract
period decreases broker eftort, which results in lower search intensity by the broker and
an increase in marketing time. Geltner, Kluger, and Miller (1991) suggest that a finite
duration listing contract creates the incentive for agents to increase effort towards the
end of the contract, and that there can be a serious confiict of interest regarding the
reservation price, particularly at the end of the contract. Clauretie and Daneshvary (2008)
examine the tendency of brokers to increase their efforts to generate more potential
buyers, and perhaps higher offering prices, with the possible incentive to reduce the
reservation price. They find that the price-reduction effect dominates the broker effort
with a negative price effect of about 0.5% per month. Anglin and Arnott (1991) analyze
the brokerage contract between the house seller and agent (broker) using the established
principal-agent literature and find that standard commission contracts fail to allocate risk
efficiently or provide appropriate incentives for agents. Yavas (1995) examines the seller-
broker relationship in terms of a double moral hazard problem where there are
unobservable efforts of both sellers and agents, finding that the outcomes depend on the
interactions between the actions of the players.
Several studies have examined 100% commission payout contracts versus split
commission contracts as they relate to the effect on housing prices, time on the market
(TOM), and listings acquired. Munneke and Yavas (2001) develop a theoretical model
based upon the proposition that agents maximize total commissions. Agents on 100%
contracts should have more incentive to acquire listings and market properties. Their
findings indicate that the 100% contract agents have acquired an average of 30 listings
versus 18 for traditional agents, a statistically significant difference. The 100% contract
agents, however, did not have a statistically lower TOM. As predicted, 100% contract
agents were not able to obtain higher selling prices for their clients. In contrast, AUen,
Eaircloth, Eorgey, and Rutherford (2003) find that 100% contract agents' properties are
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sold more quickly and at a premium relative to properties sold by agents on split
commission. Johnson, Zumpano, and Anderson (2008) re-examine TOM and selling price,
but instead of assuming that all 100% contract agents work for RE/MAX, they include
agents working for non-RB/MAX firms who also work on 100% contracts. They find that
100% contract agents sell their listings about 35 days sooner (41% quicker) and at a
5.8% premium. Zumpano, Johnson, and Anderson (2009) compare agent and firm
characteristics for agents on a split contract versus those on 100% contracts. Their findings
indicate that 100% contract agents are more experienced, have a shorter tenure with
their current firm, and earn more income than split commission agents. These agents are
more likely to be male and work in sales offices with a larger staff. Similar to Zumpano,
Johnson, and Anderson (2009), Chinloy and Winkler (2010) develop a probit model in
the first step of their wages and hours worked models in an effort to control for sample
selection bias. The probit equation empirical results support the positive relationship of
experience and male gender as important determinants of agents on 100% contracts. They
also find that agents who work in larger firms are more Ukely to be on split contracts.
Chinloy and Winkler (2011) use a bivariate probit model with 100% versus split contracts
and ownership versus non-ownership. Their findings support earlier work; however, they
find that residual income (household income minus real estate income) is negatively
related to agents choosing to work on a 100% contract, which is contrary to the findings
of Zumpano, Johnson, and Anderson (2009). '
Methodology
Firms contract w îth an individual agent and receive a portion of the revenue generated
by the agent. In some cases the firm may also charge agents a fixed periodic fee in lieu
of, or in addition to, a portion of the revenue. Based upon the agent's productivity, a firm
may be willing to change the contract in the next period to a higher split if the agent is
expected to produce sufficient revenue to justify the split increase. If not, the firm may
require the agent to assume more of the expenses. The firm may also agree to a higher
split for the agent even if revenue increases or expense decreases for the firm do not
make the firm's profit increase. This might occur if there were externalities that affected
the willingness of the agent to work with other agents to generate additional revenue for
the firm as a whole.
The empirical specification for sales professional productivity is measured by the ending
commission percentage as follows:
y, = «0 + Xijßi + At,, - ' '-^r,. ; (1)
where Y,- is the percentage ending period commission, Xj is the matrix of exogenous
explanatory variables with regression coefficient matrix /Sj and intercept a^. The error
term is defined as /A .̂
The Xj matrix includes the beginning contract percentage that is split between the agent
and the firm and various explanatory variables that control for agent, firm, and market
environment characteristics. The Appendix lists and describes the variables.
The beginning contract rate that is set at the start of the year is assumed to encapsulate
the performance characteristics of the agent. These would include the agent's experience.
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hours worked, previous sales transaction, and revenue production, among other
variables.^ The end of period split contract percentage, however, may be revised based
upon the performance of the agent during the contract period, changes in professional
characteristics of the agent such as being a manager agent or broker-owner (with selling
responsibilities), and job changes.' The agent's performance in the period can be
measured in terms of total revenue, total dollar sales, or number of transactions, all of
which are expressed in natural logarithms. These performance measures are separately
tested, and all are expected to be positively related to the ending commission split. Agents
who are also managers are likely to receive a lower commission split since they are
engaged in managerial tasks that are typically compensated by salary. An ownership
interest may increase the ending commission split as it represents the additional ability
of the agent.*̂  Agents who are dissatisfied with their contract provisions may change jobs,
which could lead to a change in their contract split. The motivation of the agent might
be affected by the amoimt of household non-real estate income as measured by the natural
logarithm of residual income. Agents who have more residual income may have less
interest and incentive to work to generate commission income.
Periodic business expenses are incurred by the agent, including fees paid to the firm.
The agent on a 100% payout contract will pay the firm a fixed periodic expense, but even
before reaching a 100% payout contract, a firm may pay for fewer expenses as the agent
receives a greater split of the revenue. Firms generally pay more of the expenses for
agents in training. As they become more skilled, it is expected that agents become more
productive by selling more property and generating more commission revenue for
themselves and the firm. More skilled agents should have higher business expenses, but
their expenses per transaction should fall as they become more productive. To
compensate for differences in productivity among agents, business expense should be
estimated relative to productivity, as business expenses should increase with more
transactions, but because some expenses are fixed, the cost per transaction should fall.
However, business expenses are endogenous, and therefore, 2SLS is used to estimate
business expenses on a per transaction basis.^
A firm's characteristics and the market environment may influence the contract that is
offered. These factors include firm size as indicated by the natural logarithm of the
number of firm offices, whether the firm is an independent franchise (not affiliated with
a national or regional franchise), and whether the firm offers profit sharing. Larger firms
may offer smaller splits than smaller firms because they can offer benefits such as higher
levels of support staff, training, and the prospect of more sales income from their greater
name recognition. Independent franchise firms may offer larger splits to attract better
agents because they do not possess the advantages of name recognition and national
advertising, but do have the flexibility to offer larger splits to more productive agents. In
addition, franchises charge a fee, typically subtracted from the gross commission before
applying the split. Presumably the franchise provides sufficient benefits to offset the
franchise fees.**
The market environment could affect contract terms as well. These environmental factors
include the price level of the housing market as measured by the natural logarithm of the
median metropolitan single family house prices, total employment in the metropolitan
area, and the percentage change in employment. Competition for highly qualified agents
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may result in larger splits for agents in areas with higher metropolitan housing prices.
Positive changes in metropolitan employment should increase commission splits for
agents since firms are able to pay agents more and still remain profitable in areas with
growth. The effect of metropolitan size on ending commission splits is less clear. While
larger metropolitan areas should have more competition for agents, which might result
in an increase in the commission split, transaction activity may be larger with higher
selling prices, increasing the number of agents willing to work in larger areas and
decreasing the split that firms need to offer. ,
The data on real estate agent contracts are from the 2008 National Association of Realtors®
(NAR) Member Survey. The member survey represents a random sample of individuals in
a variety of real estate occupations, including sales agents and brokers, for the 2007
calendar year. In February 2008, NAR mailed the 89-question survey to 72,000 Realtors,
and in addition, an identical web-based online survey was distributed to a group of 89,400
members. After correcting for undeliverable questionnaires, 9,997 responses were
received, for an adjusted response rate of 7.7%. Agents included in the sample primarily
engage in residential real estate sales; these sales produce at least 50% of their income.
Median single-family home prices were also provided by NAR, and employment data was
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. These supplementary data sets are matched
by ZIP Code with the NAR survey data. After deleting mis-coded data, applying the
residential agent restriction, and merging the market data for regression analysis, the final
sample decreased to 1,477 observations when including all agents (split commission and
100% commission payout), 1,264 observations including agents only on split commission
at the beginning of the year, and 1,182 observations for agents beginning and ending on
split commissions. . . .
The summary statistics are shown in Exhibit 1. For the split commission sample, agents
have a mean commission split of 66.3%, with an ending split at 70.9%. The commission
split percentage represents the portion of the commission received by the agent with the
remaining portion going to the firm. The average split increased about 4.6% for these
agents during the year. However, the mean split is an underestimate of the percentage
payout for all agents because some agents chose to move to a 100% payout where they
pay a fixed, periodic fee to the firm. The number of 100% payout agents in the sample
is 310 or 12% of the total sample. ? '- '*'̂
Findings
Exhibit 2 reports the ending commission heteroscedastic-consistent estimator regression
results for all agents.' In Model 1, the dependent variable is agent total productivity as
measured by the natural logarithm of total commission revenue generated by the agent;
this commission is split by the agent with the firm, or for 100% payout agent contracts,
kept entirely by the agent. The two altemative measures of productivity reported in the
last two sets of columns include the natural logarithm of residential sales (Model 2) and
the natural logarithm of the annual number of residential transactions (Model 3).
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Exhibit 2. 2SLS Regression of the Ending Commission Rate for All
Agents
Variable
Constant
Beginning Commission Split (%)
Ln(Totai Commission Revenue)
Ln(House Sales in $)
Ln(No. House Transactions)
Manager-Seller
Broker-Owner
Profit Sharing
Change in Job
Ln(Residual income) :_
Independent Franchise
Ln{Offices)
Ln(Median Metro iHouse Pricing)
% Change in Employment
Metro Employment in 2007 (Mii.)
Business Expense Per Transaction
Adj. R̂  . . ., . ],•
F-Test
Model 1
Coeff.
-24.4855**
0.7512**
3.4659**
—
—
-4.3654**
-0.4472
5.0245**
0.5596
-0.0280
1.5047**
-0.5317**
1.8283**
0.4624*
-0.6083**
-0.0005**
0.67
230.99
T-ratio
-5.443
41.387
10.428
—
—
-4.471
-0.639
2.969
0.809
-0.498
2.671
-3.429
2.617
2.141
-5.287
-2.268
Model 2
Coeff.
-9.4196
0.7615**
—
1.3137**
—
-3.5188**
0.5418
5.4420**
-0.6029
-0.1282*
1.9001**
-0.5471**
2.9108**
0.5878*
-0.6506
-0.0011**
OJi
152.79
- - < • . . . .
•ft-- " •
T-ratio
-1.948
38.331
—
5.242
—
-3.592
0.648
2.859
-0.783
-2.065
2.962
-3.269
3.677
2.445
-5.056
-3.675
Model 3
Coeff.
6.0444
0.7481**
\ - .
—
1.8335**
-2.7197**
-0.5811
4.1247*
-0.8054
-0.1223*
1.3207*
-0.4872**
2.5759**
0.5212*
-0.5291**
0.0002
0.67
232.43
T-ratio
1.666
38.431
—
—
4.480
-2.912
-0.805
2.315
-1.210
-2.162
2.279
-3.178
3.655
2.304
-4.544
0.478
• ; • >
Notes: This table reports the regression results for the determinants of the ending commission rate for
1,477 agents who are either on a split commission or 100% contracts. Model 1 uses total commission
revenue generated during the year to measure agent productivity. Model 2 uses the dollar value of house
saies, and Model 3 uses the number of transaction sides. The number of observations in all models is
1,477. . - , n -,
* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level. • -,' •
** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
However, because the firm is expected to maximize commission revenue received rather
than gross residential sales or the number of transactions, the focus will be on commission
revenue. The F-tests for the three regressions are all statistically significant at the 0.01
level. The adjusted R-squares of the regressions explain about two-thirds of the variation
in the ending commission split rates.
The findings in Exhibit 2 suggest that the beginning commission rate is strongly related
to the ending commission split rate. That is, that new commission split is based upon the
existing rate. The ending split changes by 0.75% per 1% change in the beginning rate.
Agent productivity during the year affects the ending rate; as productivity increases so
does the ending split rate. Total commission revenue appears to have the strongest
influence on the ending split rate. Manager-sellers receive about a 4.4% lower split, while
firms offering profit sharing also have a 5% higher split. This suggests that agents who
work and receive profit sharing are likely more productive than the average agent. Broker-
owner status and agents who change their job did not have statistically different split
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commission rates than others in the sample after controlling for other influences. While
there is some evidence that agents in households with higher residual income have lower
split rates, the coefficient is not statistically significant in Model 1.
Firm characteristics and the market environment appear to influence the ending
commission split rate. Independent franchise firms offer larger splits while larger firms
offered smaller splits. One explanation is that independent franchises may employ higher
skilled, more experienced agents while larger company-owned firms have well-established
training programs in place, enabling them to more cost effectively and efficiently train
agents and to employ less skilled, more inexperienced agents. Another explanation is that
independent firms have less name recognition so they must offer larger splits to attract
agents. The economic and market environment influences splits as well. A 1% increase
in employment in a metropolitan area is associated with a 0.46% increase in the split for
the agent, while larger metropolitan markets offer about a 0.6% reduction in the split rate
per 1 million people employed. The larger volume of transactions in major metropolitan
markets may enable firms to reduce the split to agents and retain a larger portion for the
firm. In addition to liigher house prices in metro areas, which generate liigher
commissions for these agents, the larger supply of agents who work in larger metro areas
leads to more competition among agent, resulting in a lower agent splits.
The findings also suggest that more productive agents who sell more properties and lower
their business expenses per transaction also receive a larger commission split. However,
the coefficient for business expenses per transaction is not statistically significant for
Model 3, which measures productivity in terms of the number of house transaction sides
instead of in dollars.^" Therefore, the most productive agents are not only lowering their
cost per transaction, but firms are rewarding them by offering them a greater split."
The pool of all agents in Exhibit 2 includes some on 100% payout contracts at the
beginning of the year. Many of these agents are independent contractors, and therefore,
they have self-selected to receive a 100% payout contract in exchange for the payment
of periodic fees. Exhibit 3 shows the regression findings for the sample of agents who
were on split commission at the beginning of the year. These agents choose either to
remain on a split contract with their firm or move to a 100% payout contract by the
end of the year. Agents who start on a 100% payout contract are excluded from this
sample.
The regressions in Exhibit 3 are all statistically significant at the 0.01 level. However,
while the regression R-squares are still robust and range from 0.40 to 0.54, they are
significantly lower than the full sample. The difference in the overall fit of the regression
is also evident in the smaller F-values. The key coefficient that became weaker in
explaining the ending commission split is the commission at the beginning of the year;
this coefficient is smaller and although highly statistically significant, it has a much smaller
T-value. The other variable coefficients have larger magnitudes (positive and negative)
compared to their counterparts in Exhibit 2.
The regressions shown in Exhibit 4 limit the underlying sample to agents who were on
a split commission both at the beginning and end of the year. Therefore, agents who self-
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Exhibit 3. 2SLS Regression of the Ending Commission Rate for
Agents on Split Commission at the Beginning of the Year
Variable
Constant
Beginning Commission Split (%)
Ln(Total Commission Revenue)
LnlHouse Sales in $)
Ln(No. House Transactions)
Manager-Seller
Broker-Owner
Profit Sharing
Change in Job
Ln(Residual Income)
Independent Franchise
Ln(Offices)
Ln(Median Metro House Pricing)
% Change in Employment
Metro Employment in 2007 (Mil.)
Business Expense Per Transaction
A d j . R2 •' ,
F-Test
Model 1
Coeff.
-29.2566**
0.7145**
3.9136**
—
—
-4.5394**
-1.6485
5.7131**
0.9855
-0.0437
1.6423*
-0.5578**
2.2637
0.4802
-0.6738**
-0.0005*
0.54
113.16
T-ratio
-5.926
29.017
10.577
—
—
-4.253
-1.653
3.229
1.277
-0.660
2.555
-3.425
2.899
1.885
-5.369
-2.297
Model 2
Coeff.
-13.6602*
0.7323**
—
1.6135**
—
-3.6535**
-0.0447
6.0183**
-0.3981
-0.1633*
2.0619**
-0.5917**
3.3204**
0.6374*
-0.7144**
-0.0011**
0.40
64.79
T-ratio
-2.552
26.656
—
5.493
—
-3.343
-0.037
2.994
-0.473
-2.234
2.802
-3.350
3.743
2.231
-5.073
-3.464
Model 3
Coeff.
4.6352
0.7167**
— Ur
—
2.0830**
-2.6292**
-1.6154
4.6421*
-0.5747
-0.1533*
1.4923*
-0.5227**
3.1422**
0.5770*
-0.5747**
0.0002
0.54
114.32
T-ratio
1.163
26.260
• • • * " • ' "
—
4.459
-2.612
-1.526
2.499
-0.766
-2.297
2.285
-3.277
4.079
2.165
-4.542
0.495
Notes: This table reports the regression results for the determinants of the ending commission rate for
1,264 agents who are on a split commission contract at the beginning of the year. Model 1 uses total
commission revenue generated during the year to measure agent productivity. Model 2 uses the dollar
value of house sales, and Model 3 uses the number of transaction sides. The number of observations in
all models is 1,264. -,.
* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
select to work on 100% payout contracts are excluded from the regression. In essence,
this sample is "pure" because it excludes those who self-determine their commission
payout at the end of the period. However, it does introduce the bias of excluding many
high performers who choose to work on 100% payout contracts. In addition, for many
agents a 100% payout is only available by changing firms. These regression models
generally have the highest adjusted R-square statistics compared to the findings in Exhibits
2 and 3. The sample size is reduced because of the omission of all 100% payout agents,
which reduces the F-values. All models are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
The coefficient values and statistical significance levels for the split-commission agent
sample in Exhibit 4 are quite different than those reported in Exhibits 2 and 3. The
beginning commission split coefficient has a higher responsiveness in explaining the
ending commission split, and the coefficients have high T-values. However, the effect of
being a manager-seller does not reduce the ending commission split as much, while being
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Exhibit 4. 2SLS Regression of the Ending Commission Rate for Split
Commission Agents Only
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable
Constant
Beginning Commission Split (%)
Ln(Total Commission Revenue)
Ln(House Sales in $)
Ln(No. House Transactions)
Manager-Seller
Broker-Owner
Profit Sharing
Change in Job
Ln(Residual Income)
Independent Franchise
Ln(Offices)
Ln(Median Metro House Pricing)
% Change in Employment
Metro Employment in 2007 (Mil.)
Business Expense Per Transaction
Adj. R̂
F-Test
Coeff.
-13.6895**
0.7775**
2.5753**
—
—
-2.5147**
-2.1261**
1.3225
0.3523
0.0280
0.6193
-0.3558**
0.8025
-0.0398
-0.2897**
0.0000
0.71
221.35
T-ratio
-3.640
40.798
9.120
—
—
-2.985
-3.267
1.157
0.607
0.581
1.339
-3.221
1.295
-0.205
-3.014
-0.120
Coeff.
-3.7108**
0.7903**
—
1.0981**
—
-1.8663*
-1.0139
1.2454
-0.5226
-0.0530
0.8559
-0.3603**
1.4181*
0.0392
-0.3029**
-0.0004*
0.66
181.09
T-ratio
-0.915
40.082
—
5.163
—
-2.276
-1.420
1.076
-0.891
-1.023
1.706
-3.054
2.185
0.195
-2.960
-2.029
Coeff.
8.5498*
0.7731**
—
—
1.6024**
-1.1469
-2.4308**
0.2285
-0.6056
-0.0326
0.4059
-0.3249**
1.3032*
-0.0369
-0.2004
0.0006
0.67
181.36
T-ratio
2.529
31.035
—
—
3.599
-1.375
-2.810
0.164
-0.990
-0.626
0.800
-2.807
2.015
-0.167
-1.942
1.577
Notes: This table reports the regression results for the determinants of the ending commission rate for
1,182 agents who are on a split commission contract at the beginning and end of the year. Model 1 uses
total commission revenue generated during the year to measure agent productivity. Model 2 uses the
dollar value of house sales, and Model 3 uses the number of transaction sides. The number of observations
in all models is 1,182.
* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
** Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
a broker-owner has a statistically significant negative effect compared to combined
samples in Exhibits 2 and 3. The effect of independent franchise status, median metro
house prices, and change in employment are not statistically significant in the split
commission only sample. Perhaps most notable is that the business expense per
transaction variable does not have a negative and statistically significant effect on the
ending commission rate as it does for samples show^n in Exhibits 2 and 3. So while this
variable is important in explaitiing ending commission rates for those on 100% payout
commission, it is not as important in explaining ending commission rates for split-
commission agents. One reason may be that agents on split-commission contracts have
many, if not most of their expenses, paid by their affiliated firm while those on 100%
payout contracts must pay busitiess expenses themselves. Agents on 100% payout
contracts must meet their fixed expense threshold and the ability of these agents to limit
business expenses per transaction is a key component to profitability and net income
generation.
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Conclusion
The commission split between the agent and the affiliated firm represents an important
principal/agent relationship in real estate brokerage. The findings indicate that total
commission revenue generated is more important in changing the subsequent commission
rate than dollar house sales or the number of transactions. For the whole sample,
managers (with selling responsibilities) have a 4.4% lower commission rate compared
with those without managerial duties. A particularly interesting finding is that profit
sharing firms also have higher ending commission splits. Larger firms offer lower
commission rates while independent firms have higher ones. While increases in
employment increase the commission split, commission splits are lower in larger
metropolitan areas. For the entire sample, commission splits are inversely related to
business expenses per transaction, suggesting that firms consider the agent s expenses
when offering an agent-firm commission split. However, the ending commission rate is
not responsive to the business expenses per transaction for the sample of split
commission agents. In general, the ending commission rate for split commission agents
is not influenced as much by profit sharing, firm characteristics, or the economic
environment.
There are several important limitations of the study. First, the sample excludes part-time
agents because of data constraints, and also, because of inherent differences between full-
time and part-time agents. Benjamin, Chinloy, and Winkler (2009) find that the magnitude
of coefficients for agents on a 100% payout versus those on split contracts differ
substantially between full- and part-time agents, requiring the estimation of separate probit
models. Second, the time frame for this study is one year. Because real estate transactions
often take months to complete, it would be advantageous to extend the analysis over
multiple years. Third, the data consists of observations from 2007, which precedes the
collapse of the housing bubble. It is possible that the relationship between commission
splits and the explanatory variables in this study has fundamentally changed since the
housing crisis. Future research should address these limitations.
Appendix
Definition of Variables
Variable Explanation
Commission Split
Beginning Commission Split (%)
Ending Commission Split (%)
Agent Characteristics
Manager-Seller
Broker Owner
Profit Sharing
Change in Job
Commission split at the beginning of 2007. -
Commission split at the end of 2007.
A dummy variable indicating if the agent has managerial
responsibilities (Manager-Seller = 1).
A dummy variable indicating if the agent is a broker-owner (Broker
Owner =1).
A dummy variable indicating that the firm has profit sharing (Profit
Sharing = 1).
A dummy variable indicating the agent has changed jobs in 2007
(Job Change = 1) • "•••, .- • • •.; " •ir
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Variable Explanation
Ln(Residuai Income)
Ln(Total Commission Revenue)
Ln(Number of Transactions)
Ln(House Sales)
Business Expense Per Transaction
Firm and Environment
Independent Franchise
Ln(Offices)
Ln (Metro Median House Price)
% Change in Employment
Metro Employment in 2007 (Mil.)
The natural logarithm of the agent's residual income in 2007.
The natural logarithm of total commission revenue generated by the
agent in 2007
The natural logarithm of the number of sides transacted by the
agent in 2007.
The natural logarithm of dollar sales of houses transacted by the
agent in 2007.
Total business expenses divided by the number of sides transacted
in 2007.
A dummy variable indicating independent franchise firm status
(Independent Franchise Firm = 1).
The natural logarithm of the number of real estate firm offices.
The natural logarithm of the median metropolitan house price
(house price in $000).
The percentage change in employment in the metropolitan area.
Total employment in the metropolitan area in 2007.
Endnotes
Many researchers have proposed substantive remedies to the current system (e.g., Zorn
and Larsen, 1986; Miceli, 1989, 1995; Anglin and Arnott, 1991; Arnold, 1992; and Jares,
Larsen, and Zorn, 2000).
A related concern to fixed commission rates is that the splitting of commission between
listing and selling agents is not optimal. Miceli (1991) contends that that the splitting of
the commission rate between listing and selling agents avoids costly races to acquiring
listings. Agents cooperate with each other, but possibly at the expense of sellers. Miceli,
Pancak, and Simians (2007) show that in the matching of buyers and sellers stage, split
commissions in MLS transactions result in wasteful competition for listings.
There is also evidence that the agent/firm split may be related to the TOM and selling
prices of houses (Munneke and Yavas, 2001; Allen, Faircloth, Forgey, and Rutherford, 2003;
Johnson, Zumpano, and Anderson, 2008).
The use of a beginning commission rate greatly reduces the number of variables needed
to properly specify the model, thereby decreasing coUinearity among the variables.
The changing of a job to another firm may also capture the job satisfaction of the agent.
Ho'wever, it could be argued that owners may lower their commission and instead take
perquisites instead. Owners may also consider the tax consequences of receiving
commission income versus allowing the income to flow through the firm. While previous
research indicates that owners are generally more experienced than non-ow^ners, it is not
necessarily true that owners make the best agents.
The first-stage regression of the business expenses per transaction as the dependent variable
is estimated using additional instruments including agent age and experience, real estate
sales as a second career, and productivity measures including sales and number of house
transactions.
Franchise fees have been as high as 8%. For example, some RE/MAX offices offer a 100%
commission, which is applied only after 5% of the gross commission is taken off the top,
resulting in what it is really a 95/5 contract for the agent.
All regression coefficients reported in Exhibits 2, 3, and 4 are corrected for
heteroscedasticity using the White (1980) method.
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The number of house transactions appears in the denominator of the business expense per
transaction variable; this may explain why it is not statistically significant in Model 3 where
productivity is defined in terms of the number of house transactions, while it is statistically
significant in the other two models.
It is possible that the more productive agents are also reducing the business expenses per
transaction for the firm as well, or alternatively, that they are shifting more costs to the
firm. The latter case is more dramatic as firms would be willing to offer a larger split despite
shifting these expenses to the firm, although it seems unlikely to occur as firms would
resist incurring these expenses. Business expenses incurred by firms on behalf of their
agents, however, are not known.
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